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Abstract: This study empirically examines how the bank specific factors, macro-economic, and
institutional variables impact interest margins in China’s banking sector. A panel data analysis of
bank data for the period 1988–2015 was carried out. We found a significant association between
credit quality, risk aversion, liquidity risk, and the proportion of corporate and industrial loans
and the adjusted interest spread (AIS). GDP growth rate, inflation, and the proportion of national
savings to the GDP were found to have significant association with the AIS. Furthermore, institutional
variables were found to have a significant moderating effect on the AIS. We contribute to the literature
by examining a unique context and a more accurate measure of bank interest margin not used in
prior studies.
Keywords: adjusted interest spread; corporate and industrial loans; financial freedom; monetary
freedom; government spending; economic freedom
1. Introduction
What are the determinants of interest rate margin in Chinese banks? This is the question that we
address in the present paper. Net interest margin (NIM) refers to the difference between the lending
and deposit rates of banks (Birchwood et al. 2017).
A study of interest margins is important because banks are dominant players in any economy and
particularly, in developing/emerging countries, as banks are the main suppliers of finance. Bank net
interest margin is also used as one of the prime indicators of competitiveness in the financial system
(Murray Review 2014). Furthermore, interest margins are regularly watched by the central banks
across the world. The Federal Reserve and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), for example, publish
quarterly charts of bank interest margins (recent years have seen a general decline in bank interest
margins in many countries). Interest margins are also important from the perspective of savings and
investments as high interest margins can adversely impact these, particularly in developing economies
where capital markets are not fully developed (Ben Khediri and Ben-Khedhiri 2009).
The Chinese context is important because of the dominance of state-owned banks (SOBs), a feature
not seen in western economies, and as such presents unique issues not considered in prior literature
that focused on developed countries. Second, the financial stability risks in China remain elevated.
‘The level of debt in China has risen significantly over the past decade to reach very high levels, with
particularly strong growth in lending from the less regulated and more opaque parts of China’s financial
system’ (RBA Reserve Bank of Australia, p. 1). Third, the technology usage in banking in an emerging
economy such as China is different from that of developed countries with mature technology. This
can influence operating costs—one of the determinants identified in prior studies. China embarked
on banking reforms, among others, to improve banking operations technology (Tan 2016) and reduce
operating costs. Lastly, as per RBA (Reserve Bank of Australia), the interest margins in the US declined
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from nearly 4% (2000) to about 2.5% (2016), those of UK from close to 2% to 1%, Japan over 1% to less
than 1%, and Australia from 3.7% to 2.3% in the same period. However, the bank interest margins
in China which were close to 2.2% (2004), rose to about 3.7% (2014) during the study period (though
stood at 2.7% in 2016). The interest margins in China continue to remain high compared to other
countries as above. Accordingly, China presents a unique case. As the banks in China largely depend
on revenues from lending, the net interest margin is a crucial number (John 2017). The pressure on
interest margins in China can be traced to tightening of regulations by China Banking Regulatory
Commission (CBRC) which required that banks fund two-thirds of their activities with stable deposits,
tightened loan classifications, and mandated additional risk disclosures. The lack of competition from
foreign banks incorporated in China—due to policy limitations—also impacted the interest margins.
Against the above background, a study of the determinants of bank interest margins (as measured
by the adjusted interest spread—AIS) in China assumes importance. To answer the research question
indicated above, we examined the Chinese local and foreign banks data for the years 1988–2015. The
fixed effect as well as the random effect models were tested. The study found that of the bank specific
variables, such as credit quality, risk aversion, liquidity risk, and the proportion of corporate and
industrial loans, had significant association with the AIS. The macro-economic variables such as the
GDP growth rate, inflation, and the proportion of national savings to the GDP exerted significant
influence on the AIS. None of the institutional distance variables were found to be associated with the
AIS, though these were found to have some significant moderating effects on the AIS.
The present study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, the study provides
evidence from the contextual uniqueness of China. Second, SOBs in China have access to cheap
government equity in contrast to the private equity of banks in western countries which can impact
interest margins as large non-interest-bearing funds (that is, government business) becomes available
to them. Consequently, the interest margin determination models applicable in western countries may
not be relevant in the Chinese context. Third, prior studies have used interest margin as the dependent
variable but there are differences between interest margin, spread, and the adjusted spread, though the
concepts are related (RBA Reserve Bank of Australia). ‘The difference between the measures will be
larger if there are substantial non-interest-bearing deposits; in this case the spread will significantly
underestimate the true difference between the average interest received and paid’ (RBA Reserve Bank
of Australia, p. 1). Consequently, the RBA uses the AIS as the measure instead of the simple interest
margin. The present study uses this more accurate measure as the dependent variable in contrast to
prior studies.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the institutional environment as
well as the interest rate environment in which the banks in China—whether local or foreign—operate.
Section 3 presents a review of literature and describes the empirical model for interest margin
determination used by us. Section 4 is about the data and method, Section 5 presents the empirical
results and Section 6 concludes.
2. Chinese Banking Industry: Institutional Setting and Interest Rate Liberalization
The banking industry, as a major financial intermediary and a resource allocator in Chinese
economy, has been undergoing substantial reforms over the last four decades. Despite these financial
sector reforms, however, the Chinese financial market continues to be heavily regulated with limited
links to the larger economy (Allen et al. 2017).
Starting with a planned economy and a planned interest rate regime, China later adopted a gradual
and cautious approach to liberalize interest rates. Though the central bank—the People’s Bank of China
(PBOC)—was established in 1984, deregulation of bank lending and deposit rates formally started after
1999 when the PBOC removed all restrictions on money market and bond market rates. In October
2015, the PBOC removed the deposit interest rate ceiling, paving the way for the full liberalization of
interest rates. However, the PBOC will continue setting benchmark savings and lending rates for an
unspecified period. So far, the Chinese banking system has largely focused on traditional financial
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intermediation between savers and borrowers. Consistent with this, around two-thirds of Chinese
banks’ income is generated by these activities (CBRC Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission).
Further, Chinese banks command enough capital resources and have been able to transform most of the
nation’s vast savings into deposits, and then into loans, most of which go to state-owned-enterprises
(SOEs) (Liang 2016). The five largest state controlled commercial banks in China account for around
one-half of Chinese banking system assets, and deposits contributed 85% of loans to SOEs in 2009
(Grant et al. 2012; Cary 2013).
Although the PBOC set the benchmark interest for deposit and lending activities, the actual rates
set by individual banks could float within a small range around the benchmark rate. After 2000, the gap
between the benchmark deposit rate and lending rate was almost fixed. Under these circumstances,
the interest rate margins for the Chinese banks are protected. Banks can lock their profits for each
dollar they lend due to this theoretically fixed interest margin. Consequently, prima facie, there would
be little interest in studying bank interest margins in China. However, within the limits set by the
PBOC, many factors do impact bank interest margins. What are these factors then? Do factors like size,
proportion of non-performing loans, composition of assets and liabilities and others impact Chinese
bank interest margins?
Traditionally, the SOEs in China, whose loan requirement is very large, are supported by SOBs
(Brandt and Zhu 2000). During the transition period, China adopted a dual interest rate system where
under the SOEs can borrow at subsided rates from SOBs while the non-SOEs must pay the market
interest rates (which is usually higher) to finance their investment projects (Chen 2002). The extent of
the subsidy received by the SOEs can be gauged from the following. The borrowing rate for SOEs was
about 2% while the average annual borrowing rates for SOEs would be 3.5% without state support
based solely on their stand-alone profiles (The Economist 2016). It is also reported that SOEs account for
over a third of domestic investment, and local governments account for 90% of all domestic fixed-asset
investment in infrastructure. One of the major funding sources of the local government are bank loans
(Allen et al. 2017). However, such loans also contribute to the high level of non-performing loans
(NPLs) in the Chinese banking system.
Foreign banks were permitted to operate in China after the banking sector reforms with the
expectation that their presence would help enhance competitive efficiency and improve the structure of
the country’s banking system (Leung 1997). According to the annual report issued by CBRC (Chinese
Banking Regulatory Commission) by the end of 2015, there were 37 wholly foreign-owned banks (with
306 branches under them), two joint-venture banks (with four branches under them), and one wholly
foreign-owned finance company operating in China. However, there are some restrictions on the
expansion of foreign banks. During the 1990s, foreign banks could only provide foreign currency loans
and deposits to firms with foreign investment or to foreign individuals living in China. In December
2006, the Chinese government removed the geographical, clients, and currency restrictions on foreign
banks and thereby sought to establish a level-playing field between foreign and local banks. Foreign
banks, however, continue to face challenges as they are expected to provide credit for purposes such as
agriculture and rural credit, or finance for small and medium enterprise (SMEs). However, such type
of lending involves enormous risk especially because foreign banks may not have required insights
in the local situation and cultural issues involved. As a result of these factors, though China has the
largest banking sector in the world, foreign banks accounted for only 1.38% of the total banking assets
in China as of December 2015 (a 0.35% decline compared to their market share in 2013). The lack of
competition from foreign banks naturally influences overall bank interest margins.
3. Literature Review
Ho and Saunders (1981) seminal paper on the determinants of interest margin elucidates the theory
and provides the evidence. The study integrated the expected utility theory and the hedging theory
and drew on the literature on the bid-ask prices for security market dealers. The study found that the
degree of bank’s risk aversion, the market structure in which the bank operates (that is, competition),
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the average size of bank transactions, and the variance of interest rates influence bank net interest
margin. They found that even in highly competitive markets, interest margins can exist because of
uncertainty in transaction which they call pure spread.
Following the work of Ho and Saunders (1981), many studies on bank interest margin
determination were undertaken across the world, especially in Europe and North America.
Angbazo (1997) found that interest margins are positively related to core capital, non-interest-bearing
reserves, and management quality, but negatively related to liquidity. The Saunders and
Schumacher (2000) seven-country study (did not include China) found that the regulatory components
in the form of interest-rate restrictions on deposits, reserve requirements, and capital-to-asset ratios
were the determinants. Maudos and de Guevara (2004) in the context of European banking found that
market power, interest risk, credit risk, risk aversion, implicit payments, and operating costs were the
determinants. Lepetit et al. (2008) in the study of 12 European countries found that interest margins
were highly impacted by fee income.
Claeys and Vennet (2008) presented a comparative analysis of the determinants of the bank
interest margins in the Central and Eastern European countries and the Western European countries.
These authors found, among others, that the presence of foreign banks reduces bank interest margins.
Doliente (2005) examined determinants of net interest margins of banks in four South East Asian
countries—Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, and Malaysia—and found that bank specific factors
(collateral, liquid assets, loan quality, operating expenses, and capital) were the determinants of bank
interest margins in these countries. In their study of determinants of bank interest margins in Russia,
Fungácˇová and Poghosyan (2011) found that these were impacted by ownership type.
Other studies on bank interest margin identified factors such as interest rate volatility (Angbazo
1997; Saunders and Schumacher 2000; Carbó-Valverde and Fernández 2007; Entrop et al. 2015), credit
risk (Angbazo 1997; Maudos and de Guevara 2004; Hawtrey and Liang 2008), operating costs (Williams
2007), and market power (Gischer and Juttner 2003; Williams 2007). These researchers found a positive
association between the above factors and interest margin. Some studies such as Demirgüç-Kunt
and Huizinga (2004) and Carbó-Valverde and Fernández (2007), however, found that the association
between market power and interest margin could be negative depending upon the state of institutional
development of a country.
There is limited literature on bank interest margins in China. Zhou and Wong (2008) examined
the determinants of net interest margins of 81 Mainland Chinese commercial banks for the period
1996 to 2003 and found that market competition, average-operating costs, degree of risk aversion,
transaction size, implicit interest payments, opportunity cost of reserve, and management efficiency
were the determinants of net interest margin of banks in China. Further, the study also examined
the impact of economic freedom on the overall economic wellbeing (though not on the banking
sector). Zhou et al. (2008) found that net interest margin of Chinese bank was impacted by interest
rate liberalization, capital adequacy norms, and regional operating restrictions. The Qi and Yang (2016)
study found that foreign bank presence and short-term funding exercised negative impact on Chinese
bank interest margin. García-Herrero et al. (2009) examined profitability of Chinese banks and found
that better capitalized banks were more profitable. It was also found that the four SOBs were a drag on
the overall banking system profitability. Sufian (2009) studied the profitability of Chinese commercial
banks and found that it is positively associated with size, credit risk, and capitalization but has negative
association with liquidity, overhead costs, and network embeddedness.
We improve upon these studies in several ways: (a) we use the most complete data (1988 to 2015)
of Chinese and foreign banks operating in China delete full stop (b) we use a more relevant measure
of dependent variable, the AIS, to more appropriately capture the reality, and (c) we consider the
influence that institutional factors as well as economic factors exercise on the AIS in respect of both
domestic and foreign banks which has not been considered in prior studies.
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Following from the above literature, the general hypothesis is that the AIS is affected by a set of
factors as presented below:
AIS = f(bank specific factors; industry and macro-economic factors; institutional factors)
4. Variables, Data, and Method
4.1. Dependent Variable
Following from the RBA (Reserve Bank of Australia), we used the AIS as a measure of the
dependent variable as below:
Adjusted Interest Spread (AIS) =
Interest income
interest− earning assets −
Interest paid
Total deposit
. (1)
4.2. Independent Variables
The independent variables include bank specific factors, industry and macroeconomic variables,
and institutional distance variables.
4.2.1. Bank Specific Factors
Bank specific variables as below have been frequently used in the literature.
Size of operations: Compared to smaller clients or transactions, larger transactions reduce
the frequency of operations and spread administrative overheads across a larger base, which
reduces a bank’s operating expenses per dollar of revenue, hence, economies of scale
exist (Hawtrey and Liang 2008). Chinese SOBs can offer credit at narrower margins to large corporate
clients such as the Chinese SOEs, for example, than what the smaller banks can offer. Accordingly, the
logarithm of the volume of loans as the measure of size of operation is employed in the present study
to capture the scale effects.
Credit Quality: Credit quality (risk) is measured by the proportion of loan loss provisions to total
loans indicating bank’s credit quality (Dietrich and Wanzenried 2011; Schwaiger and Liebig 2009).
A higher ratio indicates a lower credit quality and therefore exercises a negative influence on the AIS.
Risk aversion: Banks that are more risk-averse will charge higher margins (Maudos and de Guevara
2004). Following from McShane and Sharpe (1985) and Maudos and de Guevara (2004) we used the
ratio of shareholders’ funds to total assets as a measure of risk aversion.
Loan quality: The loan quality (as a measure of credit risk) is calculated as the proportion of
non-performing loans to gross loans. In theory, banks with higher credit risk are likely to adjust
upwards their interest margins to cover the potential losses (Angbazo 1997; Mody and Peria 2004;
Hawtrey and Liang 2008).
Operational inefficiency: Higher operational ratio implies higher interest margins and is indicative
of firm’s operational inefficiency. Following from Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Mody and Peria
(2004), Maudos and de Guevara (2004), Zhou and Wong (2008), we included the operational inefficiency
variable as a control variable in the bank interest margin modelling. We measured the operational
inefficiency as the overhead expenses to average assets.
Liquidity risk: In theory, holding higher proportion of liquid assets involves opportunity cost.
Banks would pass this cost on to the borrowers and depositors. As a result, these costs need to be
priced into the setting of interest margin (Kashyap and Stein 1995).
Proportion of corporate and industrial loans: is proxied by the proportion of corporate and industrial
loans to total loans to capture the effect of portfolio composition on the AIS. The highly profitable
corporate loans segment is open for fierce competition and impacts spread. ‘Vigorous competition for
new large corporate loans is being induced by the narrow spreads available on market-based funding,
as well as the growing presence of a number of foreign banks, particularly Asian-owned banks, in the
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Australian business loan market’ (RBA Reserve Bank of Australia, p. 37). Memmel (2014) asserts that
bank’s portfolio composition has a huge impact on net interest margins.
4.2.2. Industry and Macroeconomic Variables
Market share represents market power. It is measured as the proportion of bank assets to the total
assets of the banking sector in the country. Higher market share represents higher market power.
The Hirschman–Herfindhal index (HHI) is used to calculate the degree of concentration in the
banking industry. The market concentration indices exhibit the general form as below:
HHIi =
n∑
i=1
siwi, (2)
where HHIi is the market concentration index for bank i, si is the market share of bank i, wi is the
weight attached to the market share, and n is the number of banks in the market in question.
Macroeconomic environment is captured by the overall economic growth which is measured by
GDP growth rate, and GDP deflator. Further, being one measure of domestic investment, national
savings to GDP has important implications for the economy as well.
4.2.3. Institutional Variables
Four institutional distance variables are included in the study which are financial freedom
distance, government spending distance, monetary freedom distance and government effectiveness
distance. Economic freedom is an integrated index. One drawback is that a single measure may
not be able to properly capture the overall economic environment faced by the bank. Furthermore,
a highly aggregated index makes it difficult to draw policy conclusions. Therefore, we chose three
sub-categories that are related to bank operations and investigate their effects on the AIS. These
variables are based on Fraser Institute (2017) economic freedom of the world annual reports, for
the years under study, which measure a country’s openness to the other world. Financial freedom
measures banking efficiency as well as independence from government control or interference in the
financial sector. State ownership of banks is considered as a burden that adds to operational inefficiency.
Government spending indicates the level of government contribution in the economy, and monetary
freedom represents the price stability and liberalization. Each of these categories is graded on a scale
of 0 to 100 with higher values corresponding to better outcomes. It is important to note that this
study uses freedom distance values rather than merely the index per se as there are 39 foreign banks
operating in China. ‘Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services,
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to
such policies’ (World Bank 2019).
Foreign and domestic banks differ in their management strategies, clients, knowledge of the local
market, international regulatory arbitrage, and international business platform. They face different kind
of competitiveness in the banking market and different advantages in business operations (Elyasiani
and Rezvanian 2002), which eventually affect their interest margins.
Institutional distance refers to the relative distance between China and the home country of the
foreign bank. It is calculated in the same way as the cultural distance is computed. Distance calculation,
illustrated by cultural distance (Kogut and Singh 1988) is shown below:
ID j =
4∑
i=1
{ (Ii j−IiO)
2
Vi
}
4
, (3)
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where IDj is the institutional distance between host country j and the other country, Iij is country j’s
score on the ith institution dimension, IiO is the score of the other country on this dimension, and Vi is
the variance of the score of the dimension.
Finally, we included foreign banks in our dataset although the market share of these banks is
very small in China. Empirically and theoretically, foreign banks have their competitive advantages
compared to the local banks, for example, large asset base from the parent bank, international branch
network, easy access to euro-currencies market, modern banking technology, and credit management
practice etc. Foreign banks have more than doubled profits in 2011 to RMB 16.73 billion. They also
expect to grow revenues by 20% over the next three years (PWC 2012). However, the expansion of
foreign banks is limited by relevant laws and regulations of the supervisory and regulatory institutions
of China.
Table 1 provides a description of all variables.
Table 1. Description of variables.
Dependent Variable Measure and Description
AIS Measured as per formula indicated in this paper. Adjusted interest spread
Bank specific variable
Size of Operations Logarithm of total gross loans
Credit Quality Provisional loan loss/total loans
Risk Aversion Total equity/total assets
Loan Quality Impaired loans (NPL)/gross loans
Operational Inefficiency Overheads/average assets
Liquidity Risk Liquid assets/the sum of deposits and short-term funding
Proportion of Commercial and Industrial Loans
Local or Foreign Bank Dummy variable that takes value of 1 for foreign banks, otherwise 0
Portfolio composition variable
Proportion of Corporate and Industrial Loans Corporate and commercial loans/gross loans
Industry and macro-economic variable
Market Concentration Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) index (total assets)
Market Share Bank assets/total banking assets in economy
Economic Growth Real GDP growth rate
Real Interest Rate Real Interest Rate
Inflation CPI growth rate, measurement of percentage change in consumer price index
National Savings Proportion of national gross savings to GDP
Institutional variable
Financial Freedom Distance The difference between the host country’s (China) financial freedom index to theother 14 foreign countries and districts
Government Spending Distance The difference between the host country’s (China) government spending leveland the other 14 foreign countries and districts
Monetary Freedom Distance The difference between the host country (China) monetary freedom index and theother 14 foreign countries and districts
Government Effectiveness Distance The difference between the host country (China) government effectiveness indexand the other 14 foreign countries and districts
4.3. Data
Our panel dataset consists of annual data for 192 banks over the period 1998–2015. This includes
five large SOBs, 33 joint-stock commercial banks, 79 urban commercial banks, 32 rural commercial
banks, 40 foreign banks, and three rural cooperative banks in six groups of banks. We excluded the
central bank and the three policy banks from our sample. The main data source was Bankscope
from Bureau van Dijk, which compiles data mostly from the balance sheet and income statement.
Industry and macroeconomic variables were obtained from the website of China Banking Regulatory
Commission and the World Bank database such as the World Bank World Development indicators
(WDI) database (World Bank 2017). The institutional variables were obtained from the Index of
Economic Freedom report maintained by the Heritage Foundation (2018).
Furthermore, we conducted a missing value analysis and identified variables that have many
missing values. We omitted the cases that had common missing values across all the variables. With
the remaining cases, the percentage of missing values across variables ranged from 1.3% to 10%, and we
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then conducted an imputation procedure with SPSS to systematically replace the missing values for all
missing variables. In order to avoid possible effect resulting from differences in number of observations
(sample size), we chose the lowest number of observations as the sample size for subsequent analyses,
and deleted the rest of the cases. This left 1206 observations for all the variables in all the models.
4.4. Methodology
To choose the best method of conducting data analysis, a few diagnostic tests were employed. We
used the Breusch–Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test to choose between a random effects regression
and simple OLS regression. The Prob > chi2 equals zero and as such there is evidence of significant
differences across banks. Consequently, the random effects regression was run. To decide between
fixed or random effects regression, the Hausman test was employed. It suggested that all models
reject the null hypothesis (with Prob > chi2 = 0.000) which indicated that the fixed effect model is
appropriate. The variable of Local or Foreign Bank was omitted due to collinearity, though it is an
important variable we would like to investigate. Consequently, we considered Local or Foreign Bank
as a moderating variable. The model is stated as below:
Adjusted Interest Spreadi,t
= α0 +
8∑
k=1
βBank Speci f ic Variablesk,it
+
6∑
L=1
β Industry and Macroeconomic VariablesL,it
+
4∑
M=1
β Institutional VariablesM,it + µi + εit,
(4)
where i = 1, 2, . . . , n, refers to banks, and t = 1, 2, . . . , T, refers to yearly time period during the period
1988–2015. The AISit is defined as the net interest margin for bank i at year t; α0 represents the constant
term. ui represents the time effects.
Following from prior literature, bank specific variables include the size of operations, credit
risk, risk aversion, loan quality, operational inefficiency, liquidity risk, proportion of corporate and
industrial loans, and local or foreign bank ownership.
Industry and macroeconomic variables include market concentration, market share, economic
growth, economic growth inflation, real interest rate, and the proportion of national savings to the GDP.
Institutional variables include financial freedom distance, government spending distance,
government effectiveness distance, and monetary freedom distance. The value ui denotes the
individual effect, which does not change with time. The coefficient β measures the sensitivity of each
of these variables to the dependent variable.
We estimated four models respectively. Model 1 includes all bank specific variables. Model 2
includes industry and macroeconomic variables. Model 3 includes institutional variables. Model 4 is
the full model with all the variables included.
In order to understand the institutional factors better, we examined whether institutional distance
between China and other countries will weaken or eliminate the effects on the AIS. Therefore, we
included an interaction term between each of the three institutional distances and the variable of local
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or foreign bank with each of the bank-specific factors in the model. Following Balli and Sørensen
(2013), the model used is specified below:
Adjusted Interest Spreadi,t
= α0 +
7∑
k=1
βBank Speci f ic Variablesk,it
+
3∑
L=1
βModerating VariablesL,it
+
7∑
M=1
β(ModeratorL,it
−ModeratorL,it)(Bank Speci f ic VariableK,it
− Bank Speci f ic VariableK,it) + µi + εit.
(5)
5. Empirical Results
5.1. Summary Statistics
Table 2 provides the summary statistics on the variables used in the model.
This table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum characteristics of all
variables under consideration based on different groups of banks and on average. Overall, the mean
value of the AIS for all the banks was approximately 2.967% and ranged from −1.30% to 11.125%.
Size of operations is proxied by the gross loans. Apparently, SOBs control substantial operations
in the banking sector. The loan loss provision relative to total loans, which is an indicator of the quality
of the credit portfolio, has an average value of 0.73%, which is consistent across different groups of
banks in our sample. On average, risk aversion was around 9.185%, with foreign-owned banks having
the highest average value of 20.691%, suggesting that they are well-capitalized banks. Liquidity risk is
similar for all the banks with an average percentage of 34.216.
Notably, there is wide cross-bank variation in the sample with market power ranging from 18.945%
for five large SOBs to near 0% for foreign incorporated banks in China.
China’s average inflation rate over the study period was 3.08%, and GDP growth averaged 9.55%.
Of the total loans, 76.366% went to the corporate and industrial sectors. Surprisingly, in a few cases the
risk aversion ratios are negative. We found that four Chinese banks recorded negative equity in the
years of 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 respectively. These four banks are Agricultural Bank of China
(NY −727,605 million in 2008); Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (CNY −535,844 million in
2004); China Resources Bank of Zhuhai (CNY −514.1 million in 2007); China Everbright Bank (CNY
−5490.4 million in 2004; CNY −2550.8 million in 2005, CNY −182.5 million in 2006).
The negative equity condition could be traced to the bank making losses year after year and
borrowed to fund non-performing loans. Consequently, the liabilities exceeded assets resulting in a
negative equity.
As the banking sector in China is largely government-owned, the negative equity was not
considered to be a cause for worry as the government would recapitalize such banks out of the
budget. In 1999, for example, to address the problem of non-performing loans, four asset management
companies were established to take over the non-performing assets from the banks and sell them off to
the investors. Despite being the major creditors in China, “Chinese banks seem to be unfairly neglected
in the discussions on bankruptcy” (Wei and Chen 2018, p. 110).
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Table 2. Summary Statistics.
Adjusted
Interest
Spread
Size of
Operation
(Millions CNY)
Credit
Risk (%)
Risk
Aversion
(%)
Loan
Quality
(%)
Operational
Inefficiency
(%)
Liquidity
(%)
Proportion of
Corporate and
Industrial Loan (%)
Market
Share (%)
Market
Concentration
Real
Interest
Rate (%)
GDP
Growth
Rate (%)
CPI
(%)
National
Gross Savings
to GDP (%)
Government
Effectiveness
Distance
Government
Spending
Distance
Monetary
Freedom
Distance
Financial
Freedom
Distance
Five Large State-Controlled Commercial Banks
Mean 2.630 3,020,800.000 0.684 5.197 9.354 1.475 22.717 79.550 10.393 1303.039 2.229 9.559 4.154 44.739 0.033 0 0 0
Std. Dev. 0.877 2,759,870.000 0.317 2.877 10.906 1.322 12.014 11.773 3.815 380.534 3.404 2.252 5.634 5.399 0.175 0 0 0
Minimum 0.628 18,549.500 0.055 −13.710 0.860 0.467 6.576 36.494 2.668 420.632 −7.977 3.907 −1.408 36.459 −0.349 0 0 0
Maximum 7.317 11,900,000.000 1.603 10.670 39.600 7.789 56.558 94.639 18.945 1794.081 7.348 14.231 24.237 51.966 0.408 0 0 0
Count 113 120 88 120 67 113 120 120 64 64 120 120 120 120 84 120 120 120
33 Joint-Stock Commercial Banks
Mean 2.793 354,602.200 0.572 7.547 3.761 0.015 34.019 76.643 0.977 1295.152 2.057 9.693 3.644 46.779 0.067 0 0 0
Std. Dev. 1.120 548,796.800 4.102 7.933 9.675 0.014 45.204 14.216 0.985 369.168 3.284 2.128 4.755 4.994 0.160 0 0 0
Minimum −1.303 140.942 −69.186 −1.320 0.000 0.001 1.047 0.027 0.002 420.632 −7.977 3.907 −1.408 36.459 −0.349 0 0 0
Maximum 9.215 2,824,286.000 6.901 64.800 99.300 0.115 738.464 98.816 3.683 1794.081 7.348 14.231 24.237 51.966 0.408 0 0 0
N 366 384 299 383 254 341 384 384 273 273 384 384 384 384 316 384 384 384
79 Urban Commercial Banks
Mean 3.270 42,560.430 0.917 6.260 2.786 0.012 25.991 81.374 0.100 1301.168 1.988 9.666 2.680 48.801 0.089 0 0 0
Std. Dev. 1.309 69,869.060 0.682 2.398 6.919 0.004 11.524 11.785 0.134 365.298 2.687 2.075 2.237 3.590 0.138 0 0 0
Minimum 0.208 10.992 −0.185 −6.420 0.000 0.005 2.643 10.495 0.000 420.632 −7.977 6.900 −1.408 36.459 −0.349 0 0 0
Maximum 11.125 775,390.000 5.863 23.590 100.000 0.035 71.378 98.853 0.009 1794.081 7.348 14.231 24.237 51.966 0.408 0 0 0
Count 767 786 701 786 559 670 777 786 717 717 786 786 786 786 756 786 786 786
32 Rural Commercial Banks
Mean 3.240 57,826.340 0.948 6.656 3.697 0.012 28.859 81.219 0.118 1231.346 1.848 9.306 3.016 49.902 0.112 0 0 0
Std. Dev. 0.992 59,488.730 0.821 2.389 4.815 0.003 13.370 12.499 0.110 352.001 2.666 2.028 1.718 1.526 0.127 0 0 0
Minimum 1.184 1393.303 −0.827 0.530 0.340 0.006 2.454 35.730 0.006 420.632 −2.335 6.900 −0.766 39.832 −0.120 0 0 0
Maximum 5.936 297,325.700 6.620 12.220 22.990 0.023 64.169 97.933 0.365 1794.081 5.451 14.231 5.864 51.966 0.408 0 0 0
Count 165 170 147 170 108 136 170 170 169 169 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
40 Foreign-Owned Banks
Mean 2.382 20,992.120 0.380 20.691 1.775 0.016 60.986 59.990 0.042 1233.020 2.075 9.258 2.920 49.416 1.469 1.643 0.768 5.265
Std. Dev. 1.005 29,208.750 1.084 16.780 7.464 0.008 70.852 23.065 0.054 379.234 2.899 2.001 2.497 2.953 0.565 3.001 0.764 3.423
Minimum 0.031 15.000 −7.450 4.740 0.000 0.003 11.258 0.229 0.000 420.632 −7.977 6.900 −1.408 36.459 −0.349 0.000 0.000 0.000
Maximum 7.417 174,758.500 7.616 94.710 79.890 0.060 897.637 97.773 0.269 1794.081 7.348 14.231 24.237 51.966 2.437 12.251 3.796 9.896
Count 329 330 311 332 216 280 329 332 312 312 332 332 332 332 321 332 332 332
Three Rural Cooperative Banks
Mean 4.709 21,312.510 1.277 10.644 1.120 0.016 29.251 95.019 0.025 1008.478 2.414 8.243 3.013 49.551 0.137 0 0 0
Std. Dev. 1.950 7617.206 0.270 0.667 0.486 0.003 8.045 2.890 0.008 263.470 2.628 1.222 1.362 0.817 0.153 0 0 0
Minimum 1.953 11,295.000 0.984 8.920 0.580 0.010 14.407 89.094 0.015 420.632 −1.472 6.900 1.437 48.393 0.004 0 0 0
Maximum 7.180 33,225.300 1.726 11.230 2.060 0.019 39.065 97.639 0.033 1394.735 4.732 10.636 5.411 51.497 0.408 0 0 0
Count 10 10 6 10 9 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Total 192 Banks
Mean 2.967 305,048.200 0.734 9.185 3.242 0.014 34.216 76.366 0.671 1276.889 2.024 9.548 3.062 48.321 0.352 0.303 0.141 0.970
Std. Dev. 1.227 1,055,552.000 1.949 9.956 7.915 0.009 40.189 17.040 2.231 368.914 2.908 2.084 3.277 4.074 0.615 1.436 0.443 2.514
Minimum −1.303 10.992 −69.186 −13.710 0.000 0.001 1.047 0.027 0.000 420.632 −7.977 3.907 −1.408 36.459 −0.349 0.000 0.000 0.000
Maximum 11.125 11,900,000.000 7.616 94.710 100.000 0.115 897.637 98.853 18.945 1794.081 7.348 14.231 24.237 51.966 2.437 12.251 3.796 9.896
Count 1750 1800 1552 1801 1213 1548 1790 1802 1545 1545 1802 1802 1802 1802 1657 1802 1802 1802
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Following Maudos and de Guevara (2004), we measured the degree of market concentration by
HHI in each year for the 16-year period. As Figure 1 shows, the market concentration measured by
HHI declined after 2007, indicating growing competition among China’s banks. Yet, this competition
did not exercise any significant influence on the AIS. The overall trend of the AIS is upward despite
some fluctuations as can be seen from Figure 2. These two figures confirm the negative relationship
between market concentration and the AIS. It suggests that interest rate liberalization did not per se
help reduce net interest margins but forced the bank managements to change their existing business
models following increased fluctuations in interest rates.
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5.2. Correlation Coefficient between Variables
Table 3 highlights the pair-wise correlations between all variables. It is noteworthy that the
government effectiveness distance i highly correlated ith financial freedom distance (0.8082), and
foreign bank is highly correlated with financial freedom (0.8417), which is natural as foreign banks
enjoy higher degree of financial freedom. Economic growth measured by GDP is highly correlated
with market concentration (0.8174).
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2019, 12, 121 12 of 21
Table 3. Correlation coefficient between variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
AIS (1) 1
Size of Operations (2) −0.059 * 1
Credit Quality (3) 0.076 * 0.073 * 1
Risk Aversion (4) −0.002 −0.525 * −0.206 * 1
Loan Quality (5) −0.138 * 0.037 0.081 * −0.037 1
Operational Inefficiency (6) 0.114 * −0.151 * −0.018 0.250 * −0.006 1
Liquidity Risk (7) −0.050 * −0.362 * −0.156 * 0.608 * −0.085 * 0.181 * 1
Proportion of Corporate and
Industrial Loan (8) 0.349 * 0.124 * 0.017 −0.247 * 0.080 * −0.076 * −0.255 * 1
Local or Foreign Bank (9) −0.227 * −0.337 * −0.085 * 0.519 * −0.084 * 0.147 * 0.308 * −0.433 * 1
Market Share (10) −0.076 * 0.587 * −0.009 −0.120 * 0.116 * −0.054 * −0.099 * 0.102 * −0.138 * 1
Market Concentration (11) −0.197 * −0.203 * −0.046 −0.045 0.108 * 0.082 * −0.017 0.104 * −0.060 * 0.033 1
Real Interest Rate (12) −0.009 0.080 * 0.015 0.031 0.038 −0.035 −0.012 −0.007 0.012 −0.017 −0.558 * 1
GDP Growth Rate (13) −0.183 * −0.168 * −0.040 −0.055 * 0.093 * 0.022 −0.017 0.040 −0.070 * 0.030 0.817 * −0.570 * 1
Inflation (14) 0.105 * −0.037 0.005 0.002 −0.141 * 0.173 * 0.051 * −0.099 * −0.040 −0.016 0.269 * −0.724 * 0.327 * 1
National Gross Savings to GDP (15) 0.155 * 0.003 0.008 0.010 −0.331 * −0.176 * −0.004 0.036 0.142 * −0.069 * 0.422 * −0.312 * 0.208 * 0.008 1
Government Effectiveness Distance (16) −0.199 * −0.247 * −0.087 * 0.357 * −0.111 * 0.135 * 0.235 * −0.444 * 0.878 * −0.120 * −0.021 −0.015 −0.038 −0.020 0.153 * 1
Government Spending Distance (17) −0.171 * −0.184 * −0.057 * 0.269 * −0.052 0.107 * 0.1847 * −0.334 * 0.460 * −0.065 * −0.019 −0.008 −0.024 −0.010 0.075 * 0.356 * 1
Monetary Freedom Distance (18) −0.195 * −0.119 * −0.060 * 0.186 * −0.093 * 0.044 0.129 * −0.260 * 0.697 * −0.095 * −0.016 0.003 −0.025 −0.026 0.152 * 0.734 * 0.186 * 1
Financial Freedom Distance (19) −0.163 * −0.259 * −0.060 * 0.347 * −0.101 * 0.145 * 0.232 * −0.391 * 0.842 * −0.115 * −0.078 * 0.013 −0.080 * −0.028 0.131 * 0.808 * 0.336 * 0.599 * 1
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
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The high national gross savings rate (the proportion of national savings to the GDP) comes from
China’ high trade surpluses, which results in an economy driven by investment rather than domestic
consumption. Bosworth (2014) pointed out that higher national savings rate relative to domestic
investment will reduce domestic interest rates.
Another factor behind the negative relationship is that China controls its interest rate, and investors
have very limited financial instruments to invest. Hung and Qian (2013) suggest that emerging economy
like China will keep real interest rates low to force the national saving rate to rise in order to provide
cheap credit to industries.
The correlation coefficient is further checked with the variance inflation factor (VIF) when
performing the regression analysis procedures for Model 4. The VIF signifies the degree to which each
independent variable is explained by the other independent variable, and all variables are found well
below the suggested cut-off point of 10 (Hair et al. 1998). The variable of local or foreign bank was
found to be highly correlated to the other independent variables and was omitted from analysis.
5.3. Fixed Effects Regression Results for AIS
We interpret the results based on the fixed effects regression analysis for all the models. The
results are exhibited in Tables 4–7.
5.3.1. Bank Specific Factors and AIS
Results from Models 1 and 4 (refer to Table 4) show that four of the bank specific factors are
important determinants of the AIS. Loan loss provisions over total loans is a measure of a bank’s credit
quality. The coefficient of this variable is positive and significant which indicates that higher loan loss
provision leads to higher AIS. This result is consistent with Poghosyan (2012) that banks are expected
to require higher interest margins to compensate for funding riskier projects, and to maintain adequate
loan reserves. Marinkovic´ and Radovic´ (2014) note ‘at least for existing loan customers, if possible,
banks will re-price existing loans as they become due or when they are renegotiated. This will generate
a positive relation between default risk and the NIM, ceteris paribus’.
The coefficient of risk aversion is positive and significant, suggesting that Chinese banks are
imposing an extra bank interest margin as a compensation for taking systematic risk. Similar results are
reported by Ho and Saunders (1981) and Williams (2007) for the Australian banking sector. Meanwhile,
operational inefficiency has a positive relationship with the AIS (marginally at 10%), indicating banks
with higher operating cost will have higher AIS than banks with lower operating costs by providing
their intermediation services. Birchwood et al. (2017) have similar findings in the context of banks in
Central America and the Caribbean.
The variable of liquidity risk is significant and negatively associated with the AIS. This result is
not consistent with the literature that banks with higher risk on their credit books are likely to adjust
upwards their interest margins to cover expected losses arising from default, when compared to the
banks with lower credit risk (Angbazo 1997; Mody and Peria 2004). It is also contradictory with the
results from Birchwood et al. (2017). The result indicates that Chinese banks holding large liquid assets
to meet either regulatory requirements or depositors’ withdrawals, failed to price this factor in their
interest margins. The SOBs also get flushed with large cash deposited by SOEs unless they can find
avenues for interbank lending.
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Table 4. Fixed effects regression results: adjusted interest spread (AIS) as the dependent variable.
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Bank Specific Variables
Size of Operations 0.0453 0.0598
(0.107) (0.108)
Credit Quality 11.64 *** 12.42 ***
(4.017) (3.998)
Risk Aversion 0.0477 *** 0.0466 ***
(0.00977) (0.00993)
Loan Quality 0.00110 −0.000120
(0.00254) (0.00141)
Operational Inefficiency 30.57 * 30.18 *
(15.67) (15.80)
Liquidity Risk −0.0106 *** −0.0105 ***
(0.00199) (0.00200)
Proportion of Corporate and Industrial Loans 1.550 *** 1.658 ***
(0.283) (0.265)
Industry and Macro-economic Variables
Market Share 2.904 2.792
(2.613) (2.222)
Market Concentration −0.000210 −0.000720
(0.000473) (0.000457)
Real Interest Rate 0.119 0.170
(0.155) (0.140)
GDP Growth Rate 0.696 1.217 ***
(0.433) (0.414)
Inflation −0.0668 −0.170 ***
(0.0467) (0.0523)
Proportion of national savings to the GDP 0.221 ** 0.243 ***
(0.0858) (0.0772)
Institutional Variables
Government Effectiveness Distance 0.0964 −0.0184
(0.152) (0.142)
Government Spending Distance −0.205 0.000996
(0.146) (0.0848)
Monetary Freedom Distance −0.107 −0.126
(0.105) (0.0990)
Financial Freedom Distance 0.000892 −0.0542
(0.0353) (0.0411)
Constant 0.210 −12.91 ** 2.810 *** −19.82 ***
(0.814) (5.004) (0.0948) (5.388)
Observations 1206 1206 1206 1206
Adjusted R-Squared 0.491 0.363 0.363 0.494
Number of Banks 172 172 172 172
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2019, 12, 121 15 of 21
Table 5. The moderating effect of government effectiveness and the impact of AIS.
Variables Model 1
Bank Specific Variables
Size of Operations −0.0424
(0.135)
Credit Quality 11.44 ***
(4.118)
Risk Aversion 0.0365 ***
(0.00912)
Loan Quality 0.00243
(0.0212)
Operational Inefficiency 33.38 ***
(12.66)
Liquidity Risk −0.00908 ***
(0.00191)
Proportion of Corporate and Industrial Loans 1.659 ***
(0.271)
Moderator
Government Effectiveness Distance 2.683
(8.815)
Interaction Term
Government Effectiveness Distance × Size of Operations −0.110
(0.0935)
Government Effectiveness Distance × Credit Quality −2.243
(3.754)
Government Effectiveness Distance × Risk Aversion −0.00731
(0.00601)
Government Effectiveness Distance × Loan Quality 0.000908
(0.0213)
Government Effectiveness Distance × Operational Inefficiency 4.224
(7.880)
Government Effectiveness Distance × Liquidity Risk 0.00179
(0.00134)
Government Effectiveness Distance × Proportion of Corporate and Industrial Loans −0.427 ***
(0.153)
Constant −1.686
(8.535)
Observations 1206
Number of Banks 172
Adjusted R-Squared 0.501
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6. The moderating effect of financial freedom and the impact of AIS.
Variables Model
Bank Specific Variables
Size of Operations 0.0390
(0.112)
Credit Quality 12.30 ***
(4.314)
Risk Aversion 0.0391 ***
(0.0120)
Loan Quality 0.00491
(0.00532)
Operational Inefficiency 30.17 *
(16.17)
Liquidity Risk −0.0101 ***
(0.00196)
Proportion of Corporate and Industrial Loans 1.836 ***
(0.311)
Moderator
Financial Freedom Distance 0.134
(2.891)
Interaction Term
Financial Freedom Distance × Size of Operations −0.0347
(0.0306)
Financial Freedom Distance × Credit Quality −1.313
(0.993)
Financial Freedom Distance × Risk Aversion −0.00275
(0.00259)
Financial Freedom Distance × Loan Quality 0.00413
(0.00588)
Financial Freedom Distance × Operational Inefficiency 1.284
(2.642)
Financial Freedom Distance × Liquidity Risk 0.00110 *
(0.000586)
Financial Freedom Distance × Proportion of Corporate and Industrial Loans −0.119 *
(0.0697)
Constant 0.118
(2.816)
Observations 1206
Number of Banks 172
Adjusted R-Squared 0.499
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, * p < 0.1.
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Table 7. The moderating effect of monetary freedom and the impact of AIS.
Variables Model 1
Bank Specific Variables
Size of Operations −0.0185
(0.175)
Credit Quality −1.874
(5.428)
Risk Aversion 0.0479 ***
(0.0104)
Loan Quality 0.0123
(0.0213)
Operational Inefficiency 38.65 ***
(13.24)
Liquidity Risk −0.00120
(0.00341)
Proportion of Corporate and Industrial Loans 1.225 ***
(0.354)
Moderator
Monetary Freedom Distance −5.026
(17.70)
Interaction Term
Monetary Freedom Distance × Size of Operations −0.0798
(0.132)
Monetary Freedom Distance × Credit Quality −15.81 **
(7.007)
Monetary Freedom Distance × Risk Aversion 0.00498
(0.0153)
Monetary Freedom Distance × Loan Quality 0.0113
(0.0221)
Monetary Freedom Distance × Operational Inefficiency 11.03
(16.25)
Monetary Freedom Distance × Liquidity Risk 0.0107 ***
(0.00390)
Monetary Freedom Distance × Proportion of Corporate and Industrial Loans −0.602 *
(0.355)
(0.373)
Constant 5.573
(17.79)
Observations 1206
Number of Banks 172
Adjusted R-Squared 0.499
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Results from Models 1 and 4 also reveal that banks with a higher proportion of corporate and
industrial loans generate higher AIS. These results are quite consistent with the condition of lending
and deposits rate policies in China. These assets comprised mostly of financial securities. Furthermore,
deposit interest rate in China averaged 1.16% from 1990 until 2018, reaching an all-time high of 3.15%
in July of 1993 and a record low of 0.35% in July of 2012 (Trading Economics 2012). The low deposit
rate would have resulted in higher AIS.
5.3.2. Industry and Macroeconomic Variables and AIS
Regarding the industry and macro-economic factors, Models 3 and 4 show positive and significant
effects of GDP growth rate, and the proportion of national savings to the GDP to the AIS. It could be
because Chinese banks can take deposits from households with an artificially low level of interest and
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transfer or subsidize the corporate sector, particularly the SOEs. Bank performance was found to be
positively related to the overall economic development in China which is consistent with the theory
that high net interest margin is associated with a high rate of GDP especially in developing countries
(Gelos 2009; Tan and Floros 2012).
5.3.3. Institutional Variables and AIS
Finally, the level of difference in government spending, and monetary freedom between home
country China and foreign countries are not significant as can be seen from Model 3 in Table 4. Over the
years, Chinese governments have been borrowing heavily and the related government securities such
as complex off-balance-sheet structures are developed by banks to avoid tightening regulations that
restrict bank loans to local governments (Wu 2015). Hence, some of these assets appear as investments
rather than loans on the balance sheet, and apparently these investments failed to produce good return
to banks.
Results from Model 3 reveal that the level of difference in monetary freedom between home
country China and foreign countries is not significant. Over the years, both central and local Chinese
governments borrowed funds to finance government projects. Banks invest in treasury bills which are
issued by the government to raise short-term debt. Domestic banks have a tradition that they would
lend the money to SOEs and the government rather than to the private sector for various reasons.
Moreover, both the government and the SOEs would receive cheaper finance to fund their projects.
Treasury bills being risk free typically pay much lower interest rate than the market rate which in turn
could impact the bank interest margin.
The time-invariant variable of foreign bank or local bank was omitted from the fixed-effect model
due to collinearity. In order to understand the relationship between this independent variable and
the AIS, we adopted the approach of Pesaran and Zhou (2018) to identify and estimate the effects
of this time-invariant variable. It yielded the following results: coefficient of the variable (−0.583),
standard error (0.320), and t-value (−1.82). These estimations indicate that foreign banks operating
in China have lower AIS compared to local Chinese banks. This result is generally consistent with
Williams (2007) in the context of the Australian banking sector.
Building upon the Models 3 and 4 in Tables 4–7 report the results of the interaction of financial
freedom distance, monetary freedom distance, and government effectiveness distance with each of the
bank specific variables.
Results from Tables 5–7 show that the coefficients of financial freedom distance, monetary freedom
distance, and government effectiveness distance variables are not significant. Results from Tables 5–7
also show that these three institutional variables interact with credit quality, liquidity risk, and
proportion of corporate and industrial loans leading to lower AIS. These results suggest that when the
distance in institutional factor is high, the expected and potential positive relationship between the AIS
and credit risk and proportion of corporate and industrial loan will be strengthened. These results
support that institutional factors have a significant moderating effect on the AIS.
5.4. Robustness Tests
To guarantee the robustness of our empirical results, we conducted robustness tests using various
methods. First, we replaced our dependent variable with net interest margin and interest spread.
Second, we dropped the data before 2006 (due to lack of observations on some of the variables) and
focused on the sample data between 2007 and 2015. Third, we grouped the data based on the size of
the banks, namely, large and small.
These robustness tests confirm our main findings in Tables 4–7, thus indicating that our results
are robust. The robustness test results are available upon request from the authors.
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6. Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to develop our understanding of the determinants of bank interest
margins in China. Prior studies are generally confined to western countries. In China, the
state-owned-banks dominate the sector. Consequently, China provides a unique context for the
study. The data of Chinese banks over the period 1988–2015 were analyzed.
The study found that five bank specific variables—credit quality, risk aversion, liquidity risk,
and proportion of corporate and industrial loans—significantly affected the adjusted interest spread.
We found that macro-economic variables such as GDP growth rate, inflation, and the proportion
of national savings to the GDP have significant association with the AIS. None of the institutional
variables had any significant association with the AIS.
The bank competition in China has increased after the (WTO) agreement, and the relaxation of
policies applied to foreign banks operating in China. Yet, the AIS or net interest margin for Chinese
banks are not under pressure following higher foreign counterparts’ competition. This scenario is in
divergence with the literature. Overall, China’s banking sector is still operating in a relatively restricted
environment, and free market pricing mechanism is not yet present. The government is subsidizing
the stated owned enterprises by offering a lower deposit rate.
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